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Overview of Chapter 
This chapter begins with a comparison of different definitions of corporate governance arguing 
that governance structures are the end results of social and political processes. The chapter then 
moves on to discuss different corporate governance mechanisms and how employees in each 
mechanism are considered. Three governance mechanisms, namely the Anglo-Saxon mechanism 
in the UK, the stakeholder approach in Germany and the Japanese corporate governance 
mechanism are discussed. This is followed by a review of the development of those aspects of the 
regulatory codes that could have impacts on employees. The chapter ends with a section on three 
theoretical perspectives that are commonly used in corporate governance literature and how 
employees are positioned in governance structure within each theoretical perspective. 
 
Learning Objectives 
After completing this chapter, you should be able to: 
• Critically evaluate theoretical definitions of corporate governance and apply their 
relevance to HR decision-making; 
• Appreciate major corporate governance mechanisms and their potential impacts on 
employees; 
• Compare and contrast several theoretical arguments that are commonly used in corporate 

















HRM in the media 
“Breaches of Human Rights in Apple’s vale chains” 
In 2006, Western media revealed breaches of human rights in Foxconn, the main supplier factory 
of Apple Computer Inc. in Taiwan.  With a few possessions and a bucket to wash their clothes, 
workers lived in high security dormitories where visitors were not permitted. They had to work 
15-hours per day for $50 per month and had to do overtime when asked without being able to say 
no. Similar stories emerged about other supplier factories.  
All this was in breach of Apple’s ‘Supplier Code of Conduct’, outlining that their suppliers must 
uphold the human rights of workers; treat them with dignity and respect. According to the Code, 
the workers should have been restricted to a 60-hour work per week and not more. All that was 
reported was in breach of Apple’s Supplier Code of Conduct.  
Recent reports indicate signs of gradual improvements. Workers have access to free Wi-Fi, 
television lounges, cleaning services and even options to upgrade dorms. Nonetheless, factories 
still operate under tight security with high levels of secrecy surrounding their operations. Base 
wages are still low. Workers have to work excessive hours to make ends meet and even if they do 
not want to, they cannot refuse as there are still no independent unions negotiating their wages and 
working hours with their companies. Managers often humiliate individual workers for poor 
performance in front of others.  
 
Questions 
1. As an American company having its value chains in China, what assumptions could be made 
about how Apple Computer Inc. weighed the interests of shareholders and its workforce in its 
value chains? 








What we understand by the term “corporate governance” underlines our perception of how 
companies operating in any society can have an impact on the manner in which people are managed 
within organisations. In the UK the corporate governance codes of conducts have been devised 
primarily to protect shareholders’ interests over the interests of other parties, including employees.  
In countries like Germany and Japan, the governance mechanisms are designed in a way that 
employees' rights and interests are protected. This is achieved by the inclusion of employees in the 
governance mechanisms so that they can take part in the decision making processes and voice their 
views and concerns so that their long-term interests can be protected. A better understanding of 
different types of governance mechanism and how they operate and treat their employees can be 
attained by looking at the justification and reasoning that are argued under different theoretical 
perspectives. Hence, the chapter reviews agency theory, stakeholder theory and resource 
dependence theory. 
 
Definitions and Concepts 
The HRM policies of a company are pertinent to the overall strategic management approach 
adopted by the company. If strategic management is defined as the process through which a 
company develops its critical goals and resources (Boxall and Purcell, 2006: 55), the HRM policies 
are determined by corporate goals and the resources that the company has chosen to access. The 
decision on the choice of corporate goals and which resources to access are made at the top 
managerial level or what is commonly regarded as corporate governance. The approach taken to 
corporate governance will determine the content and approach taken on HRM-related issues, such 
as the hiring, firing and outsourcing of elements of the workforce, the training of the work force, 
employee voice issues and pay and reward packages. The next section presents discussions on 
what is meant by the term corporate governance. 
 
Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance originates in the nineteenth century when the need for legislation and 
regulation arose with the advent of limited liability companies. The term “corporate governance” 
came out of a seminal analysis by Berle and Means (1932) who drew attention to a managerial 
revolution whereby control was transferred from owners to managers. A common ownership 
model is that of “disbursed shareholding” whereby ownership is held by a wide range of remote 
shareholders rather than an owner on the premises. In such companies, professional managers 
assume the responsibility of running the company. Traditionally, most definitions of corporate 
governance allude to the interest of shareholders and how managers are entrusted with the 
responsibilities and duties to manage the company in a way that serves the shareholders’ interests. 
The regulatory codes of conduct, for example, define corporate governance as “… the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled.” (Cadbury Report, 1992)  According to the Higgs 
Report (2003: 11), “corporate governance provides an architecture of accountability - the 
structures and processes to ensure companies are managed in the interest of their owners”.  Sheik 
and Rees (1995: 5) take a similar view and state that corporate governance is a “… system whereby 
directors are entrusted with responsibilities and duties in relation to the direction of the company’s 
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affairs. It is founded on a system of accountability primarily directed towards shareholders in 
addition to maximising shareholders’ welfare”.  
 
Considering the pivotal role of corporate governance in distribution of wealth and creation of 
opportunities, everyone has an interest in how governance mechanisms are structured (ibid, 2005). 
A broad definition is by Bruchell et al. (1991: viii) who states that “ … governance is an activity 
and an art which concerns all and touches each.  And it is an art which presupposes thought.” 
Governance, in view of Starkey (1995: 843), “… is more than the legitimation of authority or 
taming of power. It lies at the heart of the organizations we work in and live our lives through. 
What we expect and demand of governance will determine what kind of society we and our 
children shall live in”. In other words, corporate governance can entail the interests of a range of 
groups rather than merely shareholders. A similar view is adopted by Tricker (1984) who makes 
the distinction between management and governance and argues that management role is pertinent 
to decision making to run the business operations efficiently within the company boarders. By 
contrast, he argues, governance is about monitoring the actions of corporate managers and 
satisfying the legitimate expectations of accountability beyond the company borders. According 
to Tricker (1984), corporate governance comprises four principle activities: (1) direction which 
deals with formulating the long term strategic direction of a company, (2) executive action which 
relates to the crucial executive decisions, (3) supervision which involves monitoring and oversight 
of management performance, and (4) accountability which is concerned with recognising 
responsibilities to those making a legitimate demand for accountability.  
 
For Keasey et al. (1997: 2), corporate governance is the formal mechanism through which senior 
managers are held accountable to shareholders first and foremost and embraces the entire network 
of formal and informal relations which involves the corporate sector and their consequences for 
society in general. By this definition, a wider range of stakeholders are taken into consideration. 
Keasy et al.’s (1997) definition goes a step further than the traditional definition of corporate 
governance which mainly addresses the separation of ownership and control in the concept of 
principle-agent problem within agency theory framework. Another broad definition is by Sheridan 
and Kendall (1998: 27) who describe corporate governance as a system of structuring, operating 
and controlling a company in order to “(1) fulfil the long term strategic goal of the owners, (2) 
consider and care for the interests of employees, (3) take account of the needs of the environment 
and the local community, (4) work to maintain excellent relations with both customers and 
suppliers, and (5) maintain proper compliance with all the applicable legal and regulatory 
requirements”. A similar view is adopted by OECD (2004) where corporate governance is defined 
as a structure involving a set of relationships between corporate managers, its shareholders as well 
as other stakeholders through which company objectives are set and eventually attained. According 
to OECD (2004: 11), governance mechanisms should be designed in a manner that improves 
economic efficiency and growth as well as enhancing investor confidence … [whereby] … synergy 
between macroeconomic and structural policies in achieving fundamental policy gaols [can be 
achieved]”.  
 
When ownership takes the form of disbursed shareholding and professional managers assume the 
responsibility of running the company, it becomes necessary to have a system of control over those 
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managers to ensure that the company is managed in the best interest of the shareholders. The 
concept of corporate governance appears to have gone further than its traditional perspective where 
shareholders are regarded as the only parties to whom companies pay attention to and are held 
accountable to. 
  
Corporate Governance Structures 
Most traditional definitions of corporate governance adhere to Anglo-Saxon governance structures 
whereby mechanisms are designed to mitigate the problems arising from separation of ownership 
from control which could ultimately lead to poor communication and hence information 
asymmetry between owners and managers leading to the lack of trust between the two groups. In 
countries with Anglo-Saxon corporate governance mechanisms, e.g. the UK and US, shareholders 
rely on boards of directors as the primary source of management oversight and accountability. In 
Anglo-Saxon structures, managers, given the opportunity, are assumed to maximize their own 
utility rather than acting in the best interest of the owners.  In order to ensure that managers act in 
the best interest of shareholders, it is imperative that governance structures are designed in such a 
way that they would ensure that managers act in the best interest of shareholders.  
 
In the UK, all the regulations regarding managerial conduct within corporations take the form of 
voluntary codes that do not have the status of law or regulations. From a statutory point of view, 
the interests of employees are considered, but that “… only their “relationship” with the company’s 
needs is to be considered, and then only as an adjunct to the aim of shareholder profit 
maximization.” (Wedderburn, 2004: 43)  Also known as the “comply-or-explain” approach, the 
use of voluntary codes ensures the greater likelihood of companies obeying the spirit, rather than 
just the letter of the law (Kirkbride and Letza, 2003). The governance regulations in the UK 
developed after a series of corporate scandals in 1990s and has continued to evolve as more 
corporate failures has unfolded over the years. The number of corporate governance committees 
established, and the resulting codes of best practice, attest to the importance attached to the subject 
of corporate governance over the years, yet critics argue that the various committees set up to 
reform corporate governance have been shaped by histories, conflicts and politics (Sikka, 2008; 
2011) and that employees, or their representatives, have been continuously kept out of governance 
mechanisms leading to the inequalities in the distribution of wealth and income within and beyond 
the corporations. A number of attempts have been made to facilitate an element of employee 
representation on UK boards going back as far as 1975 have been proposed but resisted.   
 
In contrast to the Anglo-Saxon structure, the German model adopts an approach where companies 
are required to act in the interest of all “stakeholders”. The central characteristics of the German 
corporate governance model is that all interested stakeholders – managers, employees, creditors, 
suppliers and customers – are able to monitor corporate performance (Clarke, 2007: 181). The 
German model was formed after the World War II and formally recognizes workers’ participation 
in managerial decision-making. The German corporate governance mechanism “… is not only 
bank based, but also has weak rights for minority shareholders, a lower rate of return for 
shareholders and weakly developed market for corporate control” (Beyer and Hassel, 2002: 310). 
It has a system of “… centralised wage bargaining which gives labour a prominent role in the 
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firm’s decisions on restructuring and pursuing product market strategies” (Beyer and Hassel, 2002: 
310). In other words, companies are coordinated through non-market mechanisms with a greater 
reliance on collaborative rather than competitive relationships to build firm competence.  
 
The German post-war co-determination legislation was designed to systematically involve 
employees in various aspects of business, allowing a vocational system and incentives for high 
skill levels and more stable employment (Hiss, 2009). Under this model, employee representatives 
fill half of the seats on companies’ supervisory boards. A separate management board is 
responsible for running the business day to day. The German employees can influence managerial 
decision making through mechanisms that are legally recognized. The law specifies the particular 
roles of workers and managers and how workers can influence managerial decision making. 
Employees’ participation is not always mandatory but employees are given the legal right to have 
work councils if they choose so (Blair and Roe, 1999). There is a dual system in which unions and 
employers negotiate wages while work councils oversee working conditions.  
 
The Japanese corporate governance mechanism, also adopting a stakeholder approach, was 
developed in its current format after World War II when economic policies were devised through 
strong but informal links between liberal Democratic Party, government ministries and industry 
(Aoki, 2001). This promoted a “cohesive and solidaristic model of national political economy” 
(Jackson and Miyajima, 2007: 5).  
 
In the Japanese governance mechanism employees play a central role (Dore, 2000) while 
shareholders have limited role in monitoring and control of corporate managers. By contrast to 
German system, Japanese system embodies an informal approach to the inclusion of employees 
whereby employees’ participation is assured through a set of conventions that are not legally 
recognized but where the level of employees’ participation is high due to the emphasis on long 
term relationships with employees. The concept of “lifetime employment” implies that employees 
stay with their company until retirement, reflecting strict legal constraints on dismissals, and 
“seniority wage” applies as long as employees stay with the same company, in return the company 
organizes training sessions for them to ensure that their skills are developed so that they can move 
on to other jobs within the company if they wish to or if there is a need for them to do so (Jackson 
and Miyajima, 2007).  The successful co-operation of employees can be attributed to the way 
employees are perceived to belong to the “Company Community” (Shishdo, 2000) which 
embraces a coalition of trading partners (Keiretsu members), management, board members, core 
employees, banks and other creditors (Blair and Roe, 1999). 
  
Regulatory Perspectives 
Historically the regulatory underpinning of corporate governance has been very different in Liberal 
market economies like the US and UK, than in coordinated market economies like Japan and 
Germany.  In the latter case, corporate governance is built in to the structure of companies 
themselves so no external regulation has been necessary. In liberal market economies regulatory 
intervention has generally been a response to corporate governance failures.  In US, for example, 
the approach to corporate governance is ‘regulator-led’ system that is predominantly enforced by 
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the Security Exchange Commission regulator, stock exchange listing rules and state law. By 
contrast, the UK system is ‘self-regulatory’ and is underpinned by a robust system of company 
law and market regulations. 
 
In US, each state has its own state law with many states adopting recommendations from the Model 
Business Corporation Act. All publicly listed companies, registered with the Securities Exchange, 
have to adhere to the requirements of the Securities Acts (1933 & 1934) and the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (2002). All companies listed on the NYSE (the New York Stock Exchange) and NASDAC 
(the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations) should comply with their 
corporate governance listing rules (which are in line with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and approved 
by the SEC). 
 
The UK system, by comparison, is self-regulated and shareholder-led. Shareholders play an active 
role in corporate governance and are given power and influence through company law (the 
Companies Acts, 1985 and 1989) to hold boards to account. The Acts provide shareholder rights, 
enabling a democratic process of board accountability. The Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 (FSMA) provides the framework for the regulations of the financial services. According to 
the Act, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) has the power to penalise companies for violations 
of the Listing Rules and other market regulations. At the same time, the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) has oversight role in relation to the accountancy profession and is responsible for 
setting and enforcing standards. FRC is the major independent regulator responsible for promoting 
high quality corporate governance and reporting. In UK, all the listed companies have to comply 
with the strict listing rules related to corporate governance (mainly in compliance with the 
Combined Code).  
 
UK Corporate governance developments started in 1990s as a response to corporate scandals 
starting in the late 1980s. Though not legally binding, the corporate governance codes are 
incorporated in the listing rules of the stock exchange and all publicly listed companies are required 
to communicate their level of adoption of the code, or otherwise (Solomon, 2013). This is 
commonly regarded as the “comply or explain” approach. After each major set of scandals, a 
committee forms to devise rules and guidelines as a response. The Cadbury Report was the first 
report published in 1992 by the Cadbury committee, outlining a number of recommendations 
related to the separation of the role of chief executive and chairman, selection processes of non-
executive directors, transparency of financial reporting and the need for good internal controls. 
The Cadbury report included a Code of Best Practice and its recommendations were appended to 
the Listing Rules of the LSE. It was followed by the Greenbury Report (1995) with a focus on 
directors’ remuneration. In 1996, the Hampel Report was published, reviewing the extent to which 
the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports had been implemented. This led to the publication of the 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance in 1998. The Combined Code was redrafted a number 
of times (2003; 2006; 2008; 2010, 2014; 2016; 2018). In 2003, the Higgs Report was published, 
outlining recommendations on the role of non-executive directors. Many other reports have been 
published up to this day, including: the Smith Report (2003; 2008) on audit committee; the Walker 
Report (2009) on the banking industry and Wates Corporate Governance principles (2018) on 





The study of corporate governance is complicated by the fact that the structure, role and impact of 
boards have been studied from various theoretical angles, resulting in a number of sometimes 
competing corporate governance theories (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). This multi-theoretic 
approach is considered by Kiel and Nicholson (2003) as vital for identifying the many mechanisms 
and structures which may serve to improve the proper functioning of organisations. Agency theory, 
stewardship theory, resource dependence theory and stakeholder theory are the ubiquitous 
theoretical perspectives in corporate governance literature. 
  
Agency Theory 
Agency theory is the dominant theoretical perspective in corporate governance. Its popularity is 
due to its simplicity based on the assumption that human behaviour is motivated by rational self-
interest (Daily et al., 2003). It was borne out of the existence of the shareholder-owned corporation 
defined by Berle and Means (1932). The agency relationship is described as one in which “… one 
or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on 
their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority” (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976: 308). The shareholder’s lack of active involvement in the company’s affairs results in 
information asymmetry whereby management is better informed about the opportunities, prospects 
and performance of the company than the shareholders. Healy and Palepu (2001) maintain that the 
demand for financial reporting and disclosure arise from information asymmetry and conflicts 
between managers and outside investors. 
 
The crux of agency theory is that managers as agents of shareholders can exhibit behaviour and 
take decisions that may not maximize shareholder wealth. Opportunities for managers to abscond 
with shareholders’ funds or squander them on non-wealth maximising activities are plentiful and 
well-documented (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The implication of the agency theory for corporate 
governance is that adequate monitoring or control mechanisms need to be established to protect 
shareholders from management’s conflict of interest (Kiel and Nicholcon, 2003). In another words, 
there is the need for a large group of corporate outsiders (shareholders) to be able to control the 
incentives of a large group of insiders (management) (Weinberg, 2003). Hence, Denis and 
McConnell (2003: 2) define corporate governance as “the set of mechanisms… that induce the 
self-interested controllers of a company (those that make decisions regarding how the company 
will be operated) to make decisions that maximise the value of the company to its owners…”. 
 
These control mechanisms could be either internal or external. Internal mechanisms include an 
effectively structured board, equity-based and performance-related compensation contracts, and 
concentrated ownership holdings that encourage active monitoring of managerial decisions 
(Hendry and Kiel, 2004; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The market for 
corporate control which commonly takes the form of corporate takeovers, proxy contests, and a 
legal system which guarantees investor rights (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) are external mechanisms 




To say that a corporate governance mechanism is effective is to say that the benefits of such 
mechanisms outweigh the costs. The ultimate corporate governance mechanism therefore does not 
necessarily eliminate the agency problem but rather, is a rational best response to the problem 
which attempts to balance the costs and benefits of managerial discretion (Weinberg, 2003).  
 
Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship theory, which gains its insights from the field of sociology and psychology 
(Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003), has attracted researchers’ attention both as a complement and 
a contrast to the agency theory (Daily et al., 2003). The theory recognizes that there exist non-
financial motives for managerial behaviour. These include the need for achievement, recognition, 
the intrinsic satisfaction of successful performance, respect for authority and the work ethic (Muth 
and Donaldson, 1998), and reputation (Daily et al., 2003). The steward managers intend to 
maximize corporate performance believing that they will ultimately benefit when their companies 
thrive. For example, in order to protect their reputation as expert decision makers, executives and 
directors are more likely to run the company in a manner that maximises the company’s financial 
performance. Essentially, to the degree that an executive feels that their future fortunes are bound 
to their current corporate employers, the executive may consider their interest as aligned with that 
of the corporation and shareholders even in the absence of any shareholding (Donaldson and Davis, 
1991).  
 
Based on the assumption that managers may have other motives beyond self-interest, stewardship 
theorists suggest that goal conflict may not be inherent in the separation of ownership from control 
(Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Thus, while the agency theory advocates corporate governance 
structures that control and monitor the actions of management, stewardship theory advocates the 
empowerment of management. The steward manager is empowered with the information, the tools 
and the authority to make good decisions for the organization. The principal (i.e. corporate owner) 
will fully enable the steward (i.e. managers) to act in the best interest of the company, trusting that 
the steward will make choices that maximize the long-term return of the company. It is argued that 
devising control mechanisms on stewards will significantly demotivate the steward and be 
counterproductive for both the steward and for the company (Argyris, 1964). Stewardship theorists 
strongly believe that having control empowers management to maximise corporate profits. 
Consequently, they favour CEO duality (Donaldson and Davis, 1991) and insider dominated 
boards, arguing that compared to outside directors, inside directors contribute a greater depth of 
knowledge, expertise and commitment to the company (Hendry and Kiel, 2004). 
 
Stewardship theory, according to Smallman (2004), is primarily an argument for a balanced 
governance where stewards balance tension between different beneficiaries and interest groups to 
produce firm performance that “satisfies” the interests of all parties. Trust, open communication, 
empowerment, long-term orientation and performance enhancement are regarded as factors that 
characterize management philosophy of stewardship (Davis et al., 1997). All these factors appear 
to be imperative if loyalty and commitment are to be attained at work place. For example, open 
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Stakeholder theory has its roots in politics, law and management organization studies. Its 
prominence in organisation studies is attributed to Freeman’s (1984) study in which a stakeholder 
is defined as any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the organisation’s objectives. 
Under stakeholder theory, companies owe some degree of accountability to a range of groups 
connected with their business other than shareholders. Proponents of the stakeholder theory argue 
that shareholders are the stakeholders with the least commitment to the company and the greatest 
mobility. According to stakeholder theory, companies can be viewed as having multilateral 
agreements with their multiple stakeholders. The relationship between a company and its internal 
stakeholders is regarded as being either formal or informal depending on the history of the 
relationship. It is the nature of these relationships that is argued to create strategic possibilities for 
companies (Clarke, 2007). For instance, while managers rely on their shareholders for financial 
resources, they should rely on their employees and their expertise to achieve their strategic goals. 
As Blair (1995) advocates, companies are institutional arrangements that for governing the 
relationships between all the groups that contribute to companies’ operations. Among these 
groups, employees with specialised skills can be regarded as an important group which makes the 
attainment of strategic goals plausible. If managers aim to fulfil their fiduciary duty which is to 
maximize their companies’ wealth rather than shareholders’ wealth, they are expected to consider 
the impacts managerial decisions may have on all stakeholder groups. One criticism that could be 
laid against this line of argument is that management is left with too much freedom to manoeuvre. 
Sternberg (1997), a critic of stakeholder theory, claims that because it denies that companies 
should be primarily accountable to their owners, the key concept of corporate governance is lost 
as accountability to everyone is accountability to no one. Further criticism is levied against 
stakeholder theory that even if stakeholders could be categorised according to their degree of 
importance to the company, directors (as agents) would be attempting to serve too many principles, 
and in doing so they may fail to satisfy those with a genuine claim on the organisation (Smallman, 
2004). 
  
Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory gains its prominence from economics and sociology (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989).  This theory draws attention to interdependencies of companies by focusing on the 
relationship between an organization and its constituencies. According to resource dependence 
theory, resource exchanges are central to these relationships (Pfeffer and Cohen, 1984). Under this 
theory, groups or organizations gain power over each other by controlling valued resources. For 
large public limited companies, access to scarce external resources is secured through the presence 
of outsiders, i.e. non-executive directors. Corporate boards act as co-optative mechanisms that 
allow companies to interact with their external environments in order to secure vital resources for 




Most of the literature is on top management and how, for instance, non-executive directors are 
expected to bring in external resources that aid the company gaining competitive advantage and 
achieving goals (Hillman et al., 2000). Little attention has been paid to how employees within a 
company can get hold of vital resources, such as knowledge and expertise that are imperative for 
the smooth running of operations, and how they continuously need to keep themselves up to date 
with the latest advances in their field of expertise. Any stakeholder group that hold resources vital 
to the operations of a company is believed to hold power over the company and powerful 
stakeholders are to be taken seriously by companies (Boxall and Purcell 2008; Schuler and 
Jackson, 2007). Employees, through their skills and motivation, have the power to affect corporate 
performance in significant ways.  Hence, a company that intends to be successful should choose 
human resource strategies, such as how to recruit, organise and motivate employees over time, that 
are appropriate and serve the best interest of the company and makes the attainment of corporate 
goals plausible. 
 
Implications for HRM 
The approach that an organisation takes to corporate governance strongly influences the kinds of 
HR policies it will adopt. As is explained in Chapter 1, it is generally accepted that the core 
functional activities of HR can be subdivided into: (1) Employee Relations, (2) People Resourcing, 
(3) Employee Reward and (4) Learning and Development (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2008) and 
these are the sub-categories used by the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) 
in its professional standards.  
 
Under agency theory, which dominates governance mechanisms in the most of the Anglo-saxon 
world, the separation of ownership and control implies that managers are the only ones taking 
decisions.  This feeds into how HR is supposed to operate, where for those like Ulrich (1998), the 
way for HR to retain influence is to be the indispensable ‘business partner’ of senior management.  
Where a more stakeholding approach dominates, the role of HR will still be in the service of 
management, but there may be more scope for a degree of independence – Kochan (2007), argues 
that HR will serve itself and organisations better, if it retains critical autonomy from being merely 
the perfect agent of senior management, seeking to balance a wider array of stakeholder interests.  
How does this feed into actual HR practice? 
 
In terms of reward, differences emerge between countries where shareholder-value dominates to 
ones with more stakeholder oriented approaches.  In Germany, for example, substantial pay and 
reward differences between company seniority and ordinary employees are low (Jackson, 2003). 
Minimum rates with high thresholds, as well as outlining basic provisions and premium pay (e.g. 
overtime, shift work rates, and holidays) for each grade of employees, are set through collective 
agreements (Jackson et al., 2004). Criteria for firms to categorise jobs into standardised grades are 
specified through collective agreements and works councils (Jackson et al., 2004). This 
considerably reduces the scope for firm-level variation of wages and working conditions.  This 
pattern is less so in countries where shareholder-value dominates.  The assertion that senior 
managers need to be highly rewarded in order to align their interests with shareholders is based 
upon the assumption of their rational utility maximizing behaviour. In contrast, while we have 
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witnessed many cases in Anglo-Saxon countries where senior management have received 
substantial pay packages, ordinary employees have faced the threat of redundancy (hence a 
resourcing issue) with modest, if any, compensation. As an illustration, in the UK in 2017 the 
average pay of an FTSE 100 CEO was estimated at £5.3m per annum, compared to £13,662 for 
someone on the national living wage of £7.20 an hour. FTSE 100 chief executives were paid 165 
times more than a nurse, 140 times more than a teacher and 132 times more than a police officer 
(The Equality Trust, 2017). Despite codes of conducts, there are many examples of executives 
being rewarded controversial pay packages. For example, BP boss, Bob Dudley, was awarded a 
controversial £14m pay deal despite the oil giant's massive losses of £3.6bn following a collapse 
in oil prices. 
 
For employee relations, corporate governance is directly relevant. Companies governed under the 
principle of shareholder value will be more likely to resist ‘pluralist’ employee relations 
approaches that have strong mechanisms for employee voice and favour more ‘unitarist’ 
approaches (Fox, 1966). Where the stakeholder version is more dominant, a more pluralist 
approach to employee relations will be dominant.  In countries such as Germany and Japan, the 
stakeholder approach, implies that, unlike Anglo-Saxon structures, employees are more actively 
consulted in the decision making process, mitigating managers’ exclusive right to decision making 
(Hiss, 2009). The mandatory presence of worker representatives on the supervisory boards of 
(large) German companies is a good example of this (Parsa et al, 2018a). Such mechanisms enable 
a bipartisan flow of information between managers and employees (Davies, 2000). Similarly in 
Japan, the concept of lifetime employment is convoluted with employees’ loyalty where managers 
continuously seek the views of their employees – though it has to be said this system has seen 
some erosion since the Japanese economic slowdown from 1995. In such structures, managers 
cannot easily fire employees at their discretion. For example, German work councils resist short-
term layoffs and mandate redeployment through retraining and transfers and any redundancy 
would be illegal unless the approval of the work councils is obtained (Jackson et al., 2004). 
 While, for the most part, the distinction between unitarist and pluralist approaches relates to 
collective bargaining (with unions) it can also feed into corporate governance structures 
themselves.  Thus the inclusion of worker directors on the supervisory boards of German 
companies is completely alien to the shareholder-value approach in Anglo-Saxon countries.  
 
Beyond the direct mechanisms of labour control, however, there are increasing pressures on larger 
companies - beyond just shareholders or workers - for transparency about how fairly the workforce 
is treated in their value chains (Clarke and Boersma, 2017; Parsa et al., 2018b). Recent evidence 
shows that British companies are less transparent about their employees as they pay less attention 
to their detailed issues than their German counterparts (Parsa et al., 2018a). By contrast, British 
companies tend to be more transparent about their efforts to protect the human rights of their 
external workforce than their German counterparts due to the legal requirements set out under the 
Modern Slavery Act (2015) (Germany does not have similar legal requirements for external 
workforce) even though both British and German companies aim to be more transparent about 




Companies pursue learning and development programmes with the view that doing so would 
enhance the productivity and performance of their employees which would ultimately result in 
higher shareholder values.  In comparison to agency theory, the stewardship theory views the 
whole situation from the opposite end of the spectrum whereby managers are argued to act as 
stewards who endeavour to strike the balance between different interests, deploying the culture of 
openness and trust. Here, employees are viewed as valuable resources whose motivation and 
loyalty can get a company through difficult times and put it ahead of its competitors. Although the 
governance mechanisms in Anglo-Saxon countries are predominantly analysed using agency 
theory, comparisons to training and development regimes can be made between companies who 
are governed by regulatory frameworks supporting stakeholder approaches to corporate 
governance to those where shareholder-value predominates. Thus, in countries like Germany or 
Japan (Jackson, 2004; Thelen and Kume, 2001), where legislated employment protection has made 
it harder to dismiss employees, there is greater incentive for companies to train and retrain 
employees than there is in countries like the US or UK where greater numerical flexibility means 
higher labour turnover (Harcourt et al., 2007).   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter presented an overview of the main governance mechanisms, where employees are 
located and hence treated in each mechanism. Discussions were presented on different definitions 
of corporate governance and distinctions were made between the traditional views where 
shareholders are regarded as the main focus and the more modern definitions where a range of 
stakeholders are considered. The chapter draws attention to two main governance mechanisms: 
Anglo-Saxon mechanism, the stakeholder approaches in Germany and Japan. It was illustrated that 
in the Anglo-Saxon structures, which is predominant in the UK and US, most of the attention is 
on shareholders and the interests of other stakeholders may be taken into account as long as doing 
so is in the interest of shareholders. In comparison to the Anglo-Saxon mechanisms, employees lie 
at the heart of corporate governance in Germany and Japan. In Germany, employees at different 
levels have the legal right to take part in running of their companies and in Japan, corporate 
governance is convoluted with the concept of life time employment with strict law against 
redundancies. The chapter also presented a brief review of the development of those aspects of 
corporate governance codes that could be related to employees or could reflect managerial decision 
makings that could have implications for employees. The review revealed that shareholders are 
the main stakeholders to whom corporate managers are held accountable and all the monitoring 
and incentive mechanisms are devised to curb utility maximizing behaviour of managers and 





HRM in the media: critical reflections 
 
1. As an American company having its value chains in China, what assumptions could be 
made about how Apple Computer Inc. weighed the interests of shareholders and its workforce in 
its value chains? 
 
Apple Computer Inc. is an American company, operating on shareholder-value assumptions of 
corporate governance and accountability is therefore based on ensuring that shareholder interests 
are the only legitimate interests in which is needed to be protected by corporate governance 
structures.  Under agency theory, Apple’s management focused on maximising shareholders’ value 
by concentrating its manufacturing processes in South East Asian’s cheap labour markets. When 
the poor working condition of workforce in Asia was unravel by Western Media, Apple’s share 
price declined, indicating that the fair treatment of the companies’ external workforce has 
implications for the shareholders and the job securities of their internal workforce (their 
employees).  
Comparisons with German and Japanese corporate governance mechanisms could be made in 
relation to “alternative outcomes”. In these systems employees do have a voice and their views are 
counted if not directly taken into consideration. They are expected to make proposals as how 
employees views can be considered in decision making in an Anglo-Saxon structure – may be 
employees can have representatives in governance mechanisms, or codes of best practice can be 
modified so that their views can be considered. 
 
2. How may alternative governance mechanisms lead to different outcomes? 
 
Regarding alternative approaches to corporate governance we could note that stewardship theory 
would suggest that managers can act as stewards of the shareholders as include the interests of 
their workforce and turnaround the fortune of the company. Resource Dependence theory suggests 
that employees can be regarded as one of the most precious resource that companies have as they 
offer their wealth knowledge and expertise. Had Apple recognised the importance attached to the 
interest of their external workforce, they could have avoided the negative publicity that resulted in 
a decline in their share price. The formal representation of employees in Apple’s corporate 
governance not only helps employees to engage with the company more but also allows their 
employees to reflect upon the implications of executive decisions on their welfare as well as those 
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